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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-MILLER V. MAXWELL S 
INTERNATIONAL, INC: INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY FOR SUPERVISORY 
EMPLOYEES UNDER TITLE VII AND THE ADEA . 
INTRODUCTION 
Victirris of employment discrimination usually have an ade­
quate means for bringing sui~ against their employer under Title 
VII of.the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"),1 the Age Discrim­
ination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"),2 and other federaP 
and state4 statutes. In situations where the employer is undercapi­
talized or bankrupt,S however, the victim niay not obtain adequate 
compensation from his or her employer.6 As an alternative, these 
victims have sought compensation from the supervisor responsible 
for the discrimination.7 
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (originally enacted as 
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253). 
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 &Supp. V 1993) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 
90-202, 81 Stat. 602). 
3. The Americans with Disabilities Act, for example, is analogous to TItle VII 
and the ADEA in many respects, including its purposes, 42 U.S.c. § 12101(b) (Supp. V 
1993), its remedies, 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (Supp. V 1993), and, specifically, its definition 
of the term "employer." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(5) (Supp. V 1993). 
4. For a state-by-state review of sexual harassment law, see 2 ALBE CONTE, SEX. 
UAL HARASSMENT IN TIfE WORKPLACE: LAW AND PRACflCE, §§ 10.1-.52 (1994). 
5. See Phillip L. Lamberson, Comment, Personal Liability for Violations of Title 
VII: Thirty Years of Indecision, 46 BAYLOR L. REv. 419 (1994). Lamberson presents a 
hypothetical scenario in which Mary, an employee at Company X, suffered overt dis­
crimination by her supervisor based on her sex. Mary received a $350,000 verdict in her 
favor against Company X. Unfortunately for Mary, however, Company X filed for 
bankruptcy soon thereafter, resulting in few remaining assets available to pay Mary's 
claim. Id. at 419-20. 
6. Plaintiffs have also brought suit against individual supervisors in situations 
where the employer is inlmune from liability because the supervisor's conduct is so 
outrageous as to be beyond the scope of their employment and the employer has taken 
affirmative steps to remedy the situation. Cf. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 
U.S. 57 (1986), and infra notes 133-39 and accompanying text. Absent individualliabil­
ity, there exists a "liability gap" because employers are not held liable in all situations. 
William L. Kandel, Age Discrimination: Recent Decisions by Appellate Courts Under 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act Through Mid-1993, at pt. XIII (PLI Litig. & 
Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 475, 1993). 
7. There are other circumstances in which supervisors may be named as individ­
ual defendants, such as to destroy diversity and keep the case in state court. Courts 
generally have allowed this unless the individual defendants are only nominal. See 
Bradley v. Consolidated Edison Co., 657 F. Supp. 197,207 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Charles S. 
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_Courts that have found supervisors personally liable under Ti­
tle VII and the other employment discrimination laws have fol­
lowed the congressional mandate to broadly construe these statutes 
to afford the victims adequate compensation.8 Based on a plain 
reading of the statutes' definitions of "employer," these courts have 
held that supervisors, as "agents" of -the employer, qualify as em­
ployers under the damages, provisions.9 
However, the'Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently 
found that supervisors cannot be held liable under Title VII or the 
ADEA.lO In Miller v. Maxwell's International, Inc.,n the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in a split decision determined that 
supervisors are not "employers" as defined under either Act, and 
thus could not be held subject to the statutory damage provisions. 
The court further noted that the purpose of the "agent" provision in 
the definition of employer is to incorporate respondeat superior lia­
bility into the statute.12 
This Note argues that courts should hold supervisors liable for 
their discriminatory acts under Title VII and the ADEA based on a 
number of factors.13 First, the plain, language of the statutes states 
Mishkind & Louise B. Wright, Joinder of Individual Defendants in Employment Litiga· 
tion: Is Removal Still Possible?, 19 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 117 (1993). 
Some plaintiffs may also be motivated by revenge against the discriminating super­
visor. See Lamberson, supra note 5, at 420. There may also be situations where it is 
necessary to "pierce the corporate veil" and hold individual officers and directors per­
sonally liable for discriminatory practices. See, e.g., Smith v. Capitol City Club of 
Montgomery, 850 F. Supp. 976, 981 (M.D. Ala, 1994). 
8. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 765 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concur­
ring); Owens v. Rush, 636 F.2d 283, 287 (10th Cir. 1980); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 
234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971). 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that courts must "avoid interpreta­
tions of Title VII that deprive victims of discrimination of a remedy, without clear con­
gressional mandate." County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 178 (1981). 
9. See infra notes 87-116. It should be noted that Congress has limited the liabil­
ity of federal employees for common law tort violations. Federal Employees Liability 
Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563, 4564 
(1988), enacting 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1988). The House Report stated that the bill 
"would remove the potential personal liability of Federal employees for common law 
torts committed within the scope of their employment, and would instead provide that 
the exclusive remedy for such torts is through an action against the United States under 
the Federal Tort Claims Act." H.R. REp. No. 700, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1988), re­
printed in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5945, 5947. 
10. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub 
nom. Miller v. La Rosa, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994). 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 587. 
13. For an overview of individual liability of supervisors, see generally William L. 
Kandel, Financial- Exposure of Managers for Personnel Decisions, 19 EMPLOYEE REL. 
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that supervisors should be subject to the damages provisions of the 
statutes. Second, the legislative history offers as much support for 
supervisor liability as against it. Finally, the ADEA offers even a 
stronger argument for individual supervisor liability than does Title 
VII. 
Part I of this Note provides the background to Title VII'and 
the ADEA Part I also examines the case law related to the issue of 
individual liability under these Acts. Part II discusses the recent 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decision, Miller v. Maxwell's 
International, Inc.14 Part III analyzes the Miller decision in light of 
the legislative background and pertinent case law. Finally, this 
Note concludes that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
erred in holding that individual supervisors cannot be held liable 
under either Title VII or the ADEA. 
I. BACKGROUND 
At one time, discrimination iQ. employment was a way of life 
for many people: African-Americans and ethnic minorities were 
shut out of all but the most menial of occupations;15 women re­
ceived considerably lower pay than men16 and suffered harassment 
without restraint at the hanqs of th~ir male supervisors;17 and the 
L.J. 267 (1993) (briefly examining individual liability under TItle VII and tort law); Bar­
bara B. Brown & Nancy L. Abell, Investigating and Remedying Claims of Sexual Har­
assment, at 77, pt. V (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 426, 
1992) (reviewing individual liability under discrimination statutes and tort law); Doug­
las L. Williams, Individual Liability and Defending Individual Co-Defendants (Defend­
ant's Perspective), 463 ALI-ABA CoURSE OF STUDY: ADVANCED EMPLOYMENT L. & 
LITIG. 205 (1989) (analyzing defenses for supervisors named as individual defendants in 
TItle VII suits); John P. Furfaro & Maury B. Josephson, Liability of Supervisors, 210 
N.Y. L.J. 3,27 (1993). 
For a general look at individual liability of personnel managers under various em­
ployment laws, including the National Labor Relations Act, the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act, and TItle VII, see Gary W. Florkowski, Personal Liability Under Federal Labor 
and Employment Laws: Implications for Human Resource Managers, 14 EMPLOYEE 
REL. L.J. 593 (1989). 
14. 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Miller V. La Rosa, 114 S. 
Ct. 1049 (1994). 
15. Between 1890 and 1930, roughly two million African-Americans were em­
ployed in agricultural work, compared to less than 100,000 employed in professional or 
semi-professional fields. ARTIiUR M. Ross & HERBERT HILL, EMPLOYMENT, RACE, 
AND POVERTY 4 (1967). 
16. It is estimated that in 1960, full time female workers earned only 61 % of the 
income of men in the same category; this figure decreased to 57% by 1974. JOAN AB. 
RAMSON, OLD Boys-NEW WOMEN: THE POLmcs OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 80 (1979). 
17. A 1980 study found 42% of all female federal employees surveyed had exper­
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aged and disabled were considered a burden rather than capable 
and qualified members of the working world. Virtually none of 
these employment practices were regulated by either federal or 
state government. In fact, the existing Civil Rights Amendments 
and the Reconstruction era acts18 were so narrowly interpreted by 
courts that they offered little protection to anyone.19 
The New Deal legislation of ,th~ 1930s was the first major ad­
vance into the regulation9f employment practices.20 An even more 
comprehensive attack on employment discrimination came in the 
1960s; however, with the implementation of TItle VII of the Civil 
ienced some form of sexual harassment. CONTE, supra note 4, at § 1.1. A follow-up 
study in 1986 did not show any change in this rate. Id. A survey among female employ­
ees within the private sector proved even more startling, with 90% of the women re­
sponding having Claimed some form of sexual harassment at work. Id. 
Even with the passage of Title VII, courts did not recognize a cause of action for 
sexual harassment until the mid 1970s. Id. at § 2.1. 
Unwilling to deem the "personal proclivit[ies)" of supervisors employment 
, discrimination, the courts [initially] rendered decisions ... that lacked consis­
tency and sometimes conviction as judges waded through novel issues without 
the benefit of legislative history or statutory guidance, and advanced a number 
of reasons why sexual harassment was not sex discrimination under Title VII. 
Id. (quoting Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), 
vacated on procedural grounds, 542 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977». 
18. The Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.c. § 1981 (Supp. V 1993), allows "all' 
persons" the rights: 
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full 
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and 
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punish­
ment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and no 
other. 
Id. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), creates liability against any 
person acting "under color of any [state] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us­
age" who deprives another person of rights protected by the Constitution or federal 
laws. Id. 
19. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Hodges v. United States, 203 
U.S. 1 (1906). These acts were resurrected in the late 1960s and the 1970s. See McDon­
ald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); Johnson v.Railway Express 
Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (19.75); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
20. See 1 LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 1.01, at 1-3 (1994). ' 
The New Deallegislatiori included the Unemployment Relief Act of 1933, ch. 17,48 
Stat. 22, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of race in employing people under 
the Act; the National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74~i98, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 
which created the National Labor Relations Board to deal with labor and union dis­
putes; and various executive orders aimed at eliminating discrimination by government 
contractors. This legislation did not impose specific requirements on employers, but 
rather "operated primarily to support and protect the right of workers to bargain collec­
tively with their employer." LARSON, supra, § 1.01, at 1-2. 
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Rights Act of 196421 and the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967.22 Since the passage of these Acts, Congress has con­
tinued to broaden their scope through various amendments, includ­
ing the recent implementation of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.23 
A. Title VII24 
In the wake of the Birmingham uprisings of May, 1963, Presi­
dent Kennedy proposed a civil rights bill.25 The resulting Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 was created primarily to offer minorities protec­
tion against racial discriminatiori.26 The Act included titles address­
ing voting rights,27 public accommodations,28 and school 
desegregation.29 Title VII, however, was undoubtedly the center­
piece of the Act. 30 
Congress relied on its powers under the Commerce Clause of 
21. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 u.s.c. §§ 2000e to 
2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993». 
22. Pub. L. No. 90-202,81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 
(1988 & Supp. V 1993». 
23, Pub. L. No.·102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in various sections 
of 2 U.S.c., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 2000e (Supp. V 1993». 
24. For an analysis of the legislative history of TItle VII, see Francis J. Vaas, TItle 
VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 431 (1966); CHARLES WHALEN 
& BARBARA WHALEN, THE LoNGEST DEBATE (1985). 
25. In his radio and television address of June 11, 1963, President John F. Ken­
nedy made the following statement: 
We face ... a moral crisis as a country and as a people. It cannot be met by 
repressive police action. It cannot be left to increased demonstrations in the 
streets. It cannot be quieted by token moves or talk. It is time to act in the 
Congress, in your State and local legislative body and, above all, in all of our 
daily lives. . .. I shall ask the Congress of the United States to act, to make a 
commitment it has not fully made in this century to the proposition that race 
has no place in American life or law. 
John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American People on Civil Rights, 
PuB. PAPERS, 468, 469 (June 11, 1963). 
26. HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., H.R. Doc. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1963). 
The broad purposes of TItle VII were to remove barriers favoring the class of white 
employers over minority employees, and to compensate employees for injury resulting 
from unlawful employment discriInination. There was also a need to give a statutory 
basis for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, an agency created to handle 
employment discrimination claims. Id. . 
'. 27.. Pub. L. No. '88-352, TItle 1,78 Stat 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1971 (1988». 
28. Pub. L. No. 88-352, TItle II, 78 Stat. 243, 243-46 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1988». 
29. Pub. L. N,o. 88-352, TItle IV, 78 Stat. 246, 246-49 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000c to 2000c-9 (1988». 
30. See 1 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN, ET Ab., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINAtiON 1 
(1988). 
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the Constitution31 in order to apply Title VII "to the fullest jurisdic- . 
. tional breadth constitutionally permissible."32 Because of the re­
strictive interpretations of the civil rights amendments and the early 
civil rights acts,33 Congress needed to create new legislation in or­
der to protect the rights of people who historically have been vic­
tims of discrimination in employment. 
However, Congress did not include "sex" as a protected cate­
gory in the original bill.34 Many members of Congress believed that 
the nature of sex discrimination required its own legislation.35 
These congressmen feared that including sex in the Civil Rights Act 
would make the Act too controversial, threatening the entire 
cause.36 Nevertheless, at the time the amendment was intro­
duced,37 the bill already had enough support to withstand the incor­
poration of gender protections.38 Over time, the protections 
against sexual discrimination have indeed strengthened the Act.39 
As enacted, Title VII requires that a person alleging a claim 
file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
("EEOC").40 After an EEOC determination of the merits of the 
claim, either the EEOC or the claimant may bring a civil action in 
31. u.s. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
32. LEE M. MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW, § 2:02 at 2-3 
(1993). In 1972, Congress applied its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment to ex­
tend coverage to state and local employees. Id. 
33. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. 
34. Representative Howard Smith of Virginia submitted an amendment to the bill 
to include sex as a protected class. 110 CONGo REC. 2577-84 (1964), reprinted in 1 LEG­
ISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3213­
28. As an opponent of the civil rights bill, Representative Smith intended to sabotage 
the bill by making it too radical to be passed into law. WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 
24, at 116; see also Leo Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law Ill: Title 
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963,20 HASTINGS L.J. 305, 
310-13 (1968) (describing the "peculiar" history of Title VII's sex provisions). 
35. WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 24, at 116. Representative Emanual Celler, 
the bill's sponsor, opposed the inclusion of the amendment when first proposed. He 
claimed it would strike down many state laws that already protected women from dan­
gerous employment conditions. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. See supra note 34. 
38. Representative George Meader claimed: "Smith outsmarted himself. At this 
point there was no way you could sink the bill." WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 24, at 
117. . 
39. Representative Katherine St. George in support of the amendment predicted 
that "[t)he addition of that little, terrifying word 's-e-x' will not hurt this legislation in 
any way. In fact, it will improve it. It will make it comprehensive. It will make it 
logical. It will make it right." 110 CoNG. REC. 2581 (1964), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 3221. 
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988). 
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court against the respondent(s).41 
Originally, courts could hold employers charged in the com­
plaint liable under Title VII for backpay, reinstatement, or "any 
other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate,"42 if they 
were found to have committed an "unlawful employment prac­
tice."43 Such practices today include discrimination based on race, 
sex, religion or national origin in matters of compensation or terms 
of employment.44 Furthermore, an employer cannot segregate em­
ployees45 or make any employment decision where race, sex, reli­
gion or ethnicity is a motivating factor.46 
B. TheADEA 
Because of its distinctive nature,47 Congress did not include 
age as a protected characteristic under Title VII.48 Congress did 
recognize the need to protect those over forty against discrimina­
tion, however, and requested that the Secretary of Labor create a 
41. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(2) (1988). The person alleging the claim must receive 
a right-to-sue letter pursuant to § 2000e(5)(f)(1) before pursuing remedies in federal 
court. 
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988 & Supp. V 1993». With the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, plaintiffs can also recover compensatory and punitive damages for 
intentional acts of discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. V 1993), discussed in­
fra at notes 75-81 and accompanying text. 
43. "Unlawful employment practices" are defined at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988 & 
Supp. V 1993). 
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988) states: 

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer­
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other­
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa­
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... 
Id. 
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1988) makes it unlawful for an employer "to limit, 
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which 
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other­
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin." Id. 
46. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. V 1993). Other unlawful employment prac­
tices affecting employers include: discrimination in training or apprenticeship programs, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1988); discrimination that causes disparate impact, 42 U.S.c. 
§ 2000e-2(k) (Supp. V 1993); and discriminatory testing procedures, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e­
2(1) (Supp. V 1993). 
47. See Peter H. Harris, Note, Age Discrimination, Wages, and Economics: What 
Judicial Standard?, 13 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'y. 715, 732 (1990). 
48. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, YOUR TIME WILL COME: THE LAW OF AGE DIS­
CRIMINATION AND MANDATORY RETIREMENT 14 (Russell Sage Foundation, Social Re­
search Perspectives Rep. No. 10, 1984). 
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report.49 This report eventually led to the enactment of the 
ADEA50 in 1967.51 
Like Title VII, the ADEA was enacted in order to eliminate 
employment discrimination and to prohibit unfair employment 
practices.52 The Act itself is a "hybrid"53 of Title VII and the Fair 
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").54 The objectives of the ADEA, to 
eliminate employment discrimination and prohibit unfair employ­
ment practices, parallel the objectives of Title VII.55 The remedies 
and procedures, however, are modeled on the FLSA.56 
The ADEA prohibits unfair employment practices by employ­
ers,57 employment agencies,58 and labor organizations. 59 A person 
49. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON AGE DISCRIMINATION 
IN EMPLOYMENT UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1965). 
50. For an overview of the ADEA as originally enacted, see. Note, The Age Dis­
crimination in Employment Act of1967, 90 HARV. L. REV. 380 (1976); see also Marilyn 
Mohrman-Gillis, Note, Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of1978: A 
Questionable Expansion, 27 CATH. U. L. REv. 767 (1978) (considering the 1978 amend­
ments to the ADEA). 
For a discussion of how the Civil Rights Act of 1991 impacts the ADEA, see How­
ard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog that Didn't Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1093 (1993). 
51. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 
(1988 & Supp. V 1993». 
52. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988). The purpose of the ADEA was "to promote em­
ployment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary 
age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of 
meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment." 1d. 
53. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 578 (1978). Justice Marshall, in the majority 
opinion, stated that Congress' intention in enacting the ADEA was, "on the one hand, 
... to use an existing statutory scheme and a bureaucracy with which employers and 
employees would be familiar and, on the other hand, [to reflect Congress'] dissatisfac­
tion with some elements of each of the preexisting schemes," i.e. the NLRA, the FLSA, 
and TItle VII. [d. 
54. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The FLSA was passed in 1938 as 
an effort to improve the working conditions under which a large number of the nation's 
workforce were employed. 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1988). The Act created and administered a 
minimum wage, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1988); set limits on number of working hours, 29 
U.S.C. § 207 (1988); established child labor restrictions, 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1988);' and 
provided for liquidated damages against employers, 29 U.S.c. § 216 (1988). 
55. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979); Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 
584; see also H.R. REP. No. 40(11), l02d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 696-97. 
56. Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 579 (1978): See COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC 
WELFARE, S. Doc. No. 723, 90th Cong., Illt Sess., reprinted in 113 CONGo REC. 31,250 
(1967) (enforcement procedures based on FLSA replaced the procedures in the original 
bill that were based on the NLRA). 
57. 29 U.S.c. § 623(a) (1988). Section 623(a) makes it unlawful for an employer: 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discrimi­
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can bring a civil action under section 626(b)60 to recover backpay, 
unpaid overtime compensation, and liquidated damages (for willful 
violations).61 
C. "Employers" Under Title VII and the ADEA 
"Employer" is defined under Title VII62 to include any "per­
son"63 who has fifteen or more employees64 for a required period of 
time, "and any agent65 of such a person."66 Congress amended the 
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi­
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age; 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would de­
prive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other­
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's 
age; or 
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this 
chapter. 
Id. 
58. 29 U.S.c. § 623(b) (1988). "Employment agency" is defined as "any person 
regularly undertaking with or without compensation to procure employees for an em­
ployer and includes an agent of such a person." 29 U.S.c. § 630(c) (1988). 
59. 29 U.S.c. § 623(c) (1988). "Labor organization" is defined as "a labor organi­
zation engaged in an'industry affecting commerce, and any agent of such an organiza­
tion." 29 U.S.c. § 630(d) (1988). 
60. 29 U.S.c. § 626(b) (1988). As in Title VII, a person must receive a right-to­
sue letter from the EEOC pursuant to 29 U.S.c. § 626(d) (1988) before seeking federal 
court remedies. . 
61. Moreover, §.626(b) states: "The provisions of this chapter shall be enforced 
in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in §§ 211(b), 216, , .. 
and 217 [of the FLSA]." § 626(b). 
62. Congress most likely borrowed the "employer" definition from the NLRA. ' 
See infra note 86. Contra Thurber v. Jack Reilly's, Inc., 717 F.2d 633, 634 (1st Cir; 1983) 
(finding that "employer" was borrowed from the Unemployment Compensation Act, 
26 U.S.C. § 3304 (1988», cert. denied, 466 U.S. 904 (1984). 
63. "Person" is defined as "one or more individuals, governments, governmental 
agencies, political subdivisions, labor unions, partnerships, associations, corporations, 
legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated 
organizations, trustees, trustees in cases under title 11, or receivers." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(a) (1988). 
64. "Employee" is defined as "an individual employed by an employer," except 
for persons elected or appointed to a state public office. The term does include u.s. 
citizens employed in a foreign country. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e(f) (Supp. V 1993). 
65. Congress did not define "agent" in .Title VII. However, the Equal Employ­
ment Opportunity Commission defines an agent as "a person or entity which acts or has 
the power to act on behalf of another." EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA), § 605.8(c) at 605­
22. For discussion of the agent clause as used in Title VII, see 1 LARSON, supra note 20, 
at § 5.03[2]; BARBARA L. SCHLEI AND PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA· 
TION LAW 1002 (2d ed. 1983),388 (Five Year Supp. 1989), 136 (1987-89 Supp. 1991). 
66. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e(b) (1988). The statute states in full: 

The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting com­

merce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of 

152 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:143 
definition in 197267 in order to lower the requirement for number of 
employees from twenty-five68 to the present fifteen.69 This amend­
ment achieved more effective application of Title VII to small busi­
nesses.70 "Because of the existing limitation in the bill proscribing 
coverage of Title VII to [twenty-five] or more employees or mem­
bers, a large segment of the nation's work force is excluded from an 
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and 
any agent of such a person, but such term does not include (1) the United 
States, a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States, 
an Indian tribe, or any department or agency of the District of Columbia sub­
ject by statute to procedures of the competitive service (as defined in section 
2102 of title 5), or (2) a bona fide private membership club (other than a labor 
organization) which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of title 26, 
except that during the first year after March 24, 1972, persons having fewer 
than twenty-five employees (and their· agents) shall not be considered 
employers. 
Id. 
67. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 was created to allow more 
individuals to recover under TItle VII. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.c. §§ 5108 & 5314 and various sections of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e). "Facts, 
statistical evidence and experience demonstrate that employers, labor organizations, 
employment agencies and joint labor-managem~nt committees continue to engage in 
conduct which contravenes the provisions of TItle VII. The existence of such practices 
demonstrates the immediate need to effectuate the purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964." H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2137, 2144 (1972). . 
68. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701(b), 78 Stat. 253 (codi­
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988». 
69. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 
Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.c. § 2000e(b) (1988». The House of Representatives actu­
ally recommended reduction of the requirement to eight employees. See H.R. 1746, 
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971)., The Senate amended the House bill requirement to 15 
employees as a compromise with senators concerned with the effect on small busi­
nesses. S. 2515 § 2, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); see also the remarks of Sen. Paul Fan­
nin, 118 CONGo REC. 2409-10 (1972), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 1297-1301; the remarks of Sen. 
Norris Cotton concerning the detrimental effect on small business, 118CONG. REC. 
2391 (1972), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT Op­
PORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 969, 1009-11; the remarks of Sen. James Allen, 118 CONGo 
REC. 2389-90 (1972), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOY­
MENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 1269-72. 
70. The Senate, in reviewing the recommendation for reducing the number of 
employees requirement, stated that such a reduction was necessary because "discrimi­
nation should be attacked wherever it exists ... [and] small establishments have fre­
quently been the most flagrant violators of equal employment opportunity." S. REP. 
No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 410, 417 (1972). 
Senator Jacob Javits pointed out that small businesses were more likely to discrimi­
nate "because of the smallness of the enterprises and the lack of sophisticated person­
nel techniques." 118·CONG. REC. 581 (1972), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 641, 646. 
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effective [f]ederal remedy to redress employment discrimination."71 
The House Judiciary Committee felt "that the [EEOC's] remedial 
power should also be available to all segments of the work force."72 
There is little evidence in the legislative history of Title VII to 
establish how far Congress intended to stretch the definition of 
"employer."73 With the passage of the Equal Employment Oppor­
tunity Act of 197274 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991,75 however, 
Congress clearly intended to broaden the scope of TItle VII in or­
der to give a greater number of victims more substantial legal 
remedies.76 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was enacted to "provide mone­
tary remedies for victims of intentional employment discrimination 
to compensate them for resulting injuries and to provide more ef­
fective deterrence."77 The Act allows employees to recover com­
71. H.R. REp. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 
u.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2155. 
72. Id. 
73. In 1964, Senator Joseph Clark, when asked a question on who qualifies as an 
employer under Title VII; responded that the term "employer" should be given its com­
mon dictionary meaning. 110 CONGo REc. 7216 (1964) . 
. "Employer" is defined to include the following options: 1) the owner of an enter­
prise ("as a business or manufacturing firm"); or 2) "an agent acting for such an enter­
prise in employing persons." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
743 (1976) (emphasis added). 
74. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 5108 & 
5314 and various sections of 42 U.S.c. § 2000e); see supra note 67 and accompanying 
text. 
75. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in various sections 
of 2 U.S.c., 29 U.S.C., and42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 2000e). For a comparison with the 
Civil Rights Act of 1990 that was vetoed by President Bush, see The Committee on 
Federal Legislation, The Civil Rights Act of1991,48 REc. OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF 
THE CITY OF NEW YORK 75 (1993); J.R. Franke, The Civil Rights Act of1991: Remedial 
Civil Rights Policies Prevail, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 267 (1993). For a review of issues left 
unresolved by the 1991 Act, see Robert Belton, The Unfinished Agenda of the Civil 
Rights Act of1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 921 (1993). For other articles discussing vari­
ous aspects of Title VII, see Symposium, The Civil Rights Act of1991: Theory and Prac­
tice, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 911 (1993); Symposium, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: 
Unraveling the Controversy, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 887 (1993). . 
76. For a section-by-section analysis of the damages provisions of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, see Donald R. Livingston, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and EEOC En­
forcement, 23 STETSON L. REv. 53 (1993). 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 overturned a number of United States Supreme Court 
decisions that had restrictively interpreted Title VII. See, e.g., Eric Schnapper, Statu­
tory Misinterpretations: A Legal Autopsy, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1095 (1993). 
77. H.R. REp. No. 40(1), l02d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1991), reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 552. In testimony before the Committee on Education and Labor, 
one witness noted: 
[C)ompensatory and punitive damages will not give back to a plaintiff, in many 
cases, the career that they lost or the ability to rise further in that career. 
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pensatory78 and punitive79 damages from employers for acts of 
discrimination.80 As the House Report states, the Act was intended 
to supply the same damages as awarded under 42 U.S.c. § 1981.81 
Similar to Title VII, "employer" is defined under the ADEA as 
"a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 
twenty or more employees ... : The term also means (1) any agent 
of such a person."82. Most commentators conclude that Congress 
patterned the ADEA's definition after Title VII's "employer" defi­
nition,83 as opposed to the defiriition of "employer" under the 
FLSA.84 
Congress doesn't have the ability to do that. Its [sic] a lasting permanent dam­
age. I think what the increased remedies under the bill will do, however, is 
primarily act as a deterrent. 
H.R. REP. No. 40(1) at 69, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.CAN. at 607. 
78. 42 U.S.c. § 1981a(b)(2) & (3) (Supp. V 1993) . 

. 79. 42 U.S.c. § 1981a(b)(I) (Supp. V 1993). 

80. Section 1981a(b)(3)(A)-(D) limits the amount of recovery depending on the 
size of the employer. For example, if an employer has between 15 and 100 employees 
for 20 weeks out of the year, the employer can be held liable for no more than $50,000. 
42 U.S.c. § 1981a(b)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1993). If the employer has between 100 and 200 
employees, the employer can be held liable for no more than $100,000. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981a(b)(3)(B) (Supp. V 1993). 
Amendments have already been introduced in both the House and Senate to elimi­
nate these caps on damages. S. 2062, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); H.R. 3975, 102d 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); see also S. 2053, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (amendment would 
remove caps on employers with over 50 employees). 
81. H.R. REP. No. 40(11), l02d Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1991), reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N.717. The Judicial Committee report stated: "The Committee intends that 
compensatory damages be awarded under Title VII using the same standards that have 
been applied under [§] 1981." Id. at 28-29. Moreover, the standard for punitive dam­
ages was taken "directly from civil rights case law," including 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 
U.S.c. § 1983 cases. Id. at 29. . 
82. 29 U.S.c. § 630(b) (1988). The complete definition of "employer" under the 
ADEA is as follows: 
a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more 
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in 
the current or preceding calendar year: Provided, That prior to June 30, 1968, 
employers having fewer than fifty employees shall not be considered employ­
ers. The term also means (1) any agent of such a person, and (2) a State or 
political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or 
a political subdivision of a State, and any inte.rstate agency, but such term does 
not include the United States, or a corporation wholly owned by the Govern­
ment of the United States. 
Id. 
83. SCHLEI AND GROSSMAN, supra note 65, at 483 n.9; Monte B. Lake, ADEA: A 
Review o/the Substantive Requirements, in AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT Acr 
I, 5 (Monte Lake ed., 1982). See supra note 66 which provides the definition of "em­
ployer" under Title VII. 
84. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1988). "Employer" is defined under the FLSA to be "any 
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D. Imposition of Personal Liability Under Title VII and the 
ADEA 
In addressing the issue of personal liability for supervisors, 
courts have interpreted the "employer" definitions of TItle VII and 
the ADEA in two different ways. Some courts have interpreted 
"agents" to be "employers," and, thus, subject to liability. Other 
courts have found the agent provision simply. to be a means of es­
tablishing respondeat superior liability or direct liability85 on the 
employer based on ageqcy principles.86 
1. "Agents" Are "Employers" 
Courts that have· found agents (i.e. supervisors)87 to be em­
ployers have done so based on the plain reading of the statutory 
definition of employer. However, most courts have limited 
person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an em­
ployee." Id. . 
85. In Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1987), the 
court found respondeat superior liability linked to the employer where "the person who 
engaged in the allegedly unlawful sexual harassment was not the plaintiffs statutory 
'employer'" and direct liability where the pe.rson engaging in the harassment would be 
an agent and thus an "employer." Id. at 1558 n.4. 
86. In Friend v. Union Dime Sav. Bank, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1307, 
1310 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), a district court came up with yet another interpretation of TItle 
VII's "employer" definition based on the NLRA definition of "employer." The court 
cited a 1947 amendment to the NLRA that restricted the employer definition. Id. 
Compare ch. 372, § 2, 49 Stat. 449, 450 (1935) (defining employer as "any person acting 
in the interest of an employer"), with ch. 120, § 101,61 Stat. 136, 137 (1947) (defining 
employer as "any person acting as an agent of the employer."). The Friend Court stated 
that "when Congress included 'any agent' in the NLRA it ~as an attempt to limit the 
employer's liability rather than to grant a new cause of action against all agents or 
employees of an employer." 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1310. 
The House Report to the NLRA amendment stated that the reason for the change 
was that under the prior definition, the employer was being held responsible for em­
ployees "not acting within the scope of any authority from the employer, real or appar­
ent." H.R. REp. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st SeSs., reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.S. 1135, 1137. 
Other courts have also looked to the NLRA definition in interpreting "employer" 
under TItle VII. Rivas v. Federacion de Asociaciones Pecuarias de Puerto Rico, 929 
F.2d 814, 820 n.15 (1st Cir. 1991); ct. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 226 n.8 
(1982) (finding remedial provision ofTItle VII modeled after the NLRA). 
87. Generally, supervisors are only held liable for their own harassing acts. Occa­
sionally, however, a court will find a supervisor liable if an employee's co-workers cre­
ate a "hostile work environment." See Hail v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1016 (8th 
Cir. 1988) (holding that supervisor was aware of numerous incidents of harassment and 
therefore was liable for failing to take adequate steps to prevent it); Robson v. Eva's 
Super Mkt., Inc., 538 F. Supp. 857, 863 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (finding supervisor liable 
under TItle VII for refusing to take action in response to plaintiffs complaints of har­
assment by co-workers). 
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"agents"88 to include only those people who serve "in a supervisory 
position and exercise[ ] significant control over the plaintiffs hiring, 
firing, or conditions of employment,"89 or who have "participated 
in the decision-making process that forms the basis of the 
discrimination."90 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit used the former 
definition of "agent" in Paroline v. Unisys Corp.91 In Paroline, the 
plaintiff brought a Title VII claim against both her corporate em­
ployer and her individual supervisor, alleging sexual harassment by 
the supervisor. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held 
that the supervisor could be an employer for purposes of liability.92 
"[A]s long as he or she has significant input into ... personnel deci­
sions," the supervisor is deemed to have "significant control" over 
the employee.93 The supervisor in Paroline. participated in 
88. Courts have generally been unwilling to find co-workers liable under Title VII 
for acts of discrimination. Guyette v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 518 F. Supp. 521, 525-26 
(D.N.J. 1981); 1 LARSON, supra note 20, § S.03[2][a], at 5-35 to 5-36. 
89. Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989), vacated in part on 
reh'g, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Williams v. City of Montgomery, 742 F.2d 
586,589 (11th Cir. 1984) ('''Where the employer has delegated control of some of the 
employer's traditional rights, such as hiring and firing, to a third party, the third party 
has been found to be an 'employer' by virtue of.the agency relationship."') (quoting 
SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 65, at 1002), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1053 (1985); York 
v. Tennessee Crushed Stone Ass'n, 684 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 1982) (construing an 
"agent" to be "a supervisory or managerial employee to whom employment decisions 
have been delegated by the employer"). 
90. Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting Jones v. 
Metropolitan Denver Sewage Disposal Dist. No.1, 537 F. Supp. 966, 970 (D. Colo. 
1982». In Hamilton, a firefighter alleging racial harassment brought a Title VII claim 
against the fire department and his immediate supervisors. Id. The district court deter­
mined that the supervisors tried to "freeze out" Hamilton by refusing to provide assist­
ance at radio operation, denying him car assignments and assigning him to the night 
shift. Id. at 442. Interpreting Title VII liberally, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, noting that the supervisors had authority 
over Hamilton and that they used this authority to Hamilton's detriment. Id. at 442-43. 
"To hold otherwise would encourage supervisory personnel to believe that they may 
violate Title VII with impunity." Id. at 443. 
In Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1990), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit abrogated Hamilton to the extent that agents can be held liable only in their 
"official" capacity. Id. at 228 n.2. 
91. 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989), vacated in part on reh'g, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 
1990). For a review of the Paroline decision, see Becky Leamon, Note, Employers' 
Liability for Failure to Prevent Sexual Harassment, 55 Mo. L. REv. 803 (1990). 
92. Paroline, 879 F.2d at 104. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to 
show that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to the supervisor's status as em­
ployer; thus, the district court's granting of summary judgment was inappropriate. Id. 
93. Id. (construing Tafoya v. Adams, 612 F. Supp. 1097, 1105 (D. Colo. 1985), 
affd 816 F.2d 555 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 851 (1987». The court suggested 
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Paroline's interview, recommended her for hire, and gave her work 
assignments.94 Although he was not Paroline's "formally desig­
nated" supervisor, he had enough authority over Paroline to be 
considered her supervisor.95 
A number of the United States courts of appeals that have 
found individual defendants to be agents have held these defend­
ants liable only in their "official" capacity.96 However, several of 
these decisions relate only to suits against government officials. In 
Barger v. Kansas,97 for example, the court held that the liability of 
state university administrators must be limited to acts within the 
scope of their "official" capacity.98 The Barger court further noted 
that it was "highly unlikely" that the "official capacity" rule would 
ever work to deny a plaintiff an award of backpay.99 
In other cases, courts have distinguished ADEA claims against 
that the supervisor does not have to have the "ultimate authority to hire or fire to 
qualify as an employer." Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. The court stated: 

[A]n employee may exercise supervisory authority over the plaintiff for Title 

VII purposes even though the company has formally designated another indi­

vidual as the plaintiffs supervisor. As long as the' company's management 

approves or acquiesces in the employee's exercise of supervisory control over 

the plaintiff, that employee will hold "employer" status for Title VII purposes. 

Id. 
96. See Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122,1125 n.3 (10th Cir. 1993); Harvey 
v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1990); York v. Tennessee Crushed Stone Ass'n, 
684 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 1982); Clanton v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 649 F.2d 1084, 
1099 n.19 (5th Cir. 1981); cf. Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 
n.55 (1978) (holding that "[o]fficial-capacity suits generally represent only another way 
of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent"); see also fitzpat­
rick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456-57 (1976) (determining that the Eleventh Amendment 
does not bar backpay award against state officials); Yeldell v. Cooper Green Hosp., 
Inc., 956 F.2d 1056, 1060 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding that suits against government officials 
may be brought against them in their official capacity); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 
F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding that suits could be brought against a municipal 
officer only in his or her official capacity). 
Other courts have specifically rejected the officiaUindividual distinction. See, e.g:, 
Hanshaw v. Delaware Tech. & Community College, 405 F. Supp. 292, 296 n.10 (D. Del. 
1975) ("Persons acting as officials are liable for their tortious actions as individuals; 
their official capacity relates only to potential immunity for certain kinds of discretion­
ary decisions for which they might otherwise be liable."). 
97. 630 F. Supp. 88 (D. Kan. 1985). 
98. Id. at 90-92. "Only when the official is working in his official capacity can he 
be said to be an 'agent' of the government or governmental agency, and therefore an 
'employer' within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)." Id. at 92. 
99. Id. Courts have also found individuals liable in their official capacity in light 
of the compensatory and punitive damages provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 
In Stefanski v. R.A. Zehetner & Assoc., Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D. Wis. 1994), the 
court found that the statutory damage caps limit the amount of compensatory damages 
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individual supervisors from similar claims made unde~ TItle VII. 
Although the ADEA definition of employer is generally. considered 
to parallel the TItle VII definition,lOO courts have found individual 
liability under the ADEA based on the remedies and procedures of 
the FLSA that Congress incorporated into the AbEA.lO! . 
Two cases demonstrate this method of establishing individual 
liability under the ADEA.102 In House v. Cannon MilLS Co. ,ip3 the 
court accepted the Court of AppeaJs for the Ninth Circuit's decision 
in Padway v. Palches104 with regard to TItle VII cases, but found 
that the Padway ra~ionale does not apply to ADEA claims.lOS. The 
House court noted that the damages provided under the ADEA 
were "much broader" than those which existed under TItle Vp at 
that time.106 Furthermore, since the ADEA incorporated the 
"remedies and. procedures" of the FLSA,107 this "evidences a con­
gressional intent to adopt existing interpretations of FLSA 
provisions."108 
In addition, the court in House cited cases imposing individual 
liability under the FLSA, both when the ADEA was initially en-
based on the number of employees the "respondent" has, and "an employee in his or 
her individual capacity does not have any [employees]." Id. at 1032. 
100. See, ~.g., Friend v, Union Dime Sav. Bank, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 
1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), discussed supra at note 86. Nevertheless, courts have been able 
to find distinctions in the two definitions. See generally, e.g., Court v. Admin. Office of 
the Third Jud. Dist., Salt Lake County, 764 F. Supp. 168, 170 (D. Utah 1991) (finding 
that the ADEA definition of employer does not include agents of states or state agen­
cies, but Title VII's definition does include such agents). 
101. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
102. House v. Cannon Mills Co., 713 F. Supp. 159 (M.D.N.C. 1988); Wanamaker 
v. Columbian Rope Co., 740 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1990); see also Elias v. Sitomer, 60 
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 758, 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying the reasoning of 
House and Wanamaker to hold officer of company personally liable under the ADEA). 
Judge Fletcher also based her dissent on this distinction in Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, 
Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 589-90 (9th Cir. 1993) (Fletcher, J., dissenting), cert. denied sub nom. 
Miller v. La Rosa, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994); see infra notes 182-92 and accompanying text. 
103. 713 F. Supp. 159 (M.D.N.C. 1988). 
104. 665 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1982); see infra note 117. 
105. House, 713 F. Supp. at 160. 
106. Id. Although House was decided prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it is 
still accepted that the ADEA provisions are broader than Title VII's because the 
amount of compensatory damages available under Title VII are apportioned according 
to the size of the employer. Miller, 991 F.2d at 589 n.1 (Fletcher, J., dissenting). Com­
pare 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1993) and 42 
U.S.c. § 1981a(b)(3) (Supp. V 1993). 
107. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 582 (1978). 
108. House, 713 F. Supp. at 160 (citing Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590 F.2d 
1292, 1296 (4th Cir. 1979». 
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acted109 and at the time it was amended in 1978.110 This suggests 
that Congress, assumedly aware of the findings of individual liabil­
ity under the FLSA, would have amended the ADEA if it did not 
intend for the Act to create individual liability. 111 Absent clear leg­
islative intent to the contrary, the court held that the "express lan­
guage of the statute" suggests that "agents" are "employers," and 
"employers" who violate section 623 are liable for damages under 
section- 626.112 
In Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Co. ,113 the court followed 
the Ho'use approach by analogizing to the FLSA to find individual 
liability. under the ADEA.114 '''[L]iability [under the FLSA] is 
predicated not on the existence of the employer-employee relation­
ship between [the supervisor] and the employee but on the acts he 
performs in relation to the employee. "'115 The court found that the 
plaintiff properly stated a claim under the ADEA on the basis that 
the complaint alleged that all of the defendants "participated in the 
decision making process."116 
2. Respondeat Superior 
Some courts have found that neither Title VII nor the ADEA 
were ever intended to permit individual liability, and the sole pur­
pose of the "agent" provision was to impose respondeat superior 
109. Id. (citing Chambers Constr. Co. v. Mitchell, 233 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1956); 
Brennan v. Community Servo Soc'y of N.Y., 45 N.Y.S.2d 825 (N.Y. City Ct. 1943». 
110. Id. (citing Shultz v. Chalk-Fitzgerald Constr. Co., 309 F. Supp. 1255, 1257 (D. 
Mass. 1970); Hodgson v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., 324 F. Supp. 342, 347 (D. Miss. 
1970), affd, 465 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1972); Brennan v. Whatley, 432 F. Supp. 465, 469 
(E.D. Tex. 1977); Usery v. Weiner Bros., Inc., 70 F.R.D. 615,617 (D. Conn. 1976». 
The House court also cited more recent cases: Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co., 
695 F.2d 190, 194-95 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Alberding v. Donovan, 463 U.S. 
1207 (1983); Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1510-11 (1st Cir. 1983). House, 713 F. 
Supp. at 161 n.2. 
111. House, 713 F. Supp. at 160. 
112. Id. at 161-62. 
113. 740 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1990). 
114. Id. at 135. The Wanamaker court reiterated that "the substantive prohibi­
tions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII." Id. at 134 (internal 
quotes omitted). Unfortunately, the court in Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 800 F. 
Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), cited the above-mentioned statement in finding that the 
precedent set in Wanamaker of individual liability under the ADEA was "instructive in 
interpreting Title VII." Id. at 1180. 
115. Wanamaker, 740 F. Supp. at 135 (quoting Shultz v. Chalk-Fitzgerald Constr. 
Co., 309 F. Supp. 1255,1257 (D. Mass. 1970) (emphasis added». 
116. Id. (quoting Bostock v. Rappleyea, 629 F. Supp. 1328, 1334 (N.D.N.Y. 
1985». 
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liability onto the employer.117 In support of this holding, these 
courts have stated that the definition's requirement that an em­
ployer have a certain minimum number of employees (fifteen for 
Title Vn,11s twenty for the ADEA119) suggests that Congress did 
not intend to burden "small entities."12o 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Grant v. Lone 
Star CO.121 found that individuals are not liable under Title VII's 
damages provisions. "Among the various parties subject to liability 
[under Title VII's damages provision], Congress could have made 
the individual employee committing or engaging in the dis~rimina­
tory acts liable for damages. It did not."122 Because "Congress has 
proscribed conduct, by 'persons'. in other statutory schemes," the 
Grant court held that "Congress did not intend to impose individual 
liability for ba~kpay damages under Title VII."l23 
The district courts have offered various rationales for applying 
respondeat superior liability.124 For example, the court in Saville v. 
Houston County Healthcare Authority 125 analyzed the issue of indi­
vidual liability in light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. First, the 
court noted that because the amount of damages available under 
the 1991 damages provisions is based on the size of the employer, 
117. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Padway v. Palches, 
665 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1982), has been cited regularly in more recent decisions that have 
found against individual liability under Title VII. In Padway, the plaintiff brought suit 
under Title VII seeking compensatory and punitive damages against a school superin­
tendent and five members of the Board of Trustees in their individual and official ca­
pacities. Id. at 966. The Padway court first noted that individuals cannot be held liable 
for backpay because Title VII "speaks of unlawful practices by the employer, and not of 
unlawful practices' by officers or employees of the employer." Id: at 968. The court 
went on to note that Title VII did not provide for compensatory or punitive damages 
(as of 1982 when Padway was decided). Id. 
This decision is weak precedent, however, because of the opinion's lack of analysis 
on the issue. See infra note 167. 
118. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e(b) (1988). See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text. 
119. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1988). See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
120. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied 
sub nom. Miller V. La Rosa, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994); see also Birbeck V. Marvel Lighting 
Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 510-11 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding respondeat superior appiies under 
the ADEA to actions of personnel supervisors). 
121. 21 F.3d 649 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994). 
122. Id. at 653. 
123. Id. 
124. See, e.g., Lowry V. Clark, 843 F. Supp. 228 (E.D. Ky. 1994). In discussing the 
applicability of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Lowry court stated that Congress could 
have eradicated discrimination by not limiting monetary damages and by removing the 
restrictions on employer size; instead, Congress "chose a more conservative path." Id. 
at 231. . . 
125. 852 F. Supp. 1512 (M.D. Ala. 1994). 
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supervisors who make the same salary and engage in the same dis­
criminatory activity could be held liable for largely disproportionate 
damage amounts depending upon the size of their employer.126 
Second, the Saville court reasoned that if Congress had intended to 
permit individual liability, it "would have provided some guidance 
as to how damages should be apportioned, or, whether a plaintiff 
could collect the cap amount from both the employer and the 
individual."127 
An insightful argument for respondeat superior was made by 
the court in Johnson v. Northern Indiana Public Service 'CO.l28 In 
Johnson, the court interpreted the statute to incorporate respon­
deat superior liability beca. 'se the definition of "employer" used 
the conjunction "and," rath( than "or," in the phrase "and any 
agent of such a person."129 The court commented that the "[u]se of 
the word 'and' ... ties the 'any agent of such a person' language to 
the previous language in the statute, suggesting that the 'agent' lan­
guage was not meant to stand alone in terms of defining an 'em­
ployer' under the statute."130 However, if the word "or" was 
drafted into the "any agent" clause, then the clause "could stand 
alone so that an e~ployer would be defined to include any agent of 
a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has [fif­
teen] or more employees."131 
3. DirectLiability 
~ourts have utilized agency principles based on the "agent" 
clause to find employers directly liable for the actions of their su­
pervisors.132 The United States Supreme Court, in Meritor Savings 
126. Id.; accord Vodde v. Indiana Michigan Power Co., 852 F. Supp. 676, 681 
(N.D. Ind. 1994) (finding that "[i]t is unlikely that Congress ... intended such a 'crazy 
quilt' scheme of liability" as to impose disparate scales of damages on supervisors per­
forming similar duties). 
127. Saville, 852 F. Supp. at 1525. The court concluded that if "Congress [had] 
intended individual liability, it would not have left these questions unanswered and 
would have incorporated individual liability into the damage limitation scheme in some 
manner, perhaps by establishing individual damage caps." Id. 
128. 844 F. Supp. 466 (N.D. Ind. 1994). 
129. Id. at 469. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. See Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1558-60 (11th Cir. 
1987); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 634-36 (6th Cir; 1987); see also Griffith v. 
Keystone Steel & Wire Co., 858 F. Supp. 802, 806 (C.D. Ill. 1994) (finding individuals 
liable based on the REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 359c(1) (1958». See infra 
notes 239-47 and accompanying text for an analysis on the applicability of agency 
principles. 
162 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:143 
Bank, FSB v. Vinson,133 stated that by including the term "agent" 
within the definition of employer, Congress intended courts to look 
to common-law agency principles in determining employer 
lia bili ty.134 
In Meritor, the plaintiff brought a sex discrimination claim 
against her supervisor and the bank that employed her.135 The 
Court did, not specifically address the issue of the individual liability 
of the supervisor;136 rather, the Court determined when employers 
could be held liable for the acts of their agents.137 The Court stated 
that the incorporation of the agent provision "surely evinces an in­
tent to place some limits on the acts of employees for which em­
ployers under TItle VII are to be held responsible."138 Therefore, 
the Meritor Court held that employers cannot always be found lia­
ble under TItle VII for their supervisors' actions.139 
Applying agency principles, the Court of Appeals for the Elev­
enth Circuit in Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. 140 determined 
that a supervisor was all agent of an employer '''where [the] super­
133. 477 u.s. 57 (1986). 
134. Id. 'at 72. The Supreme Court conceded that "such common-law principles 
may not be transferable in all their particulars to Title VII," but Congress nevertheless 
intended them to apply. 'Id. For general criticism of the Meritor Court's directive to 
apply agency principles, see Rachel ,E. Lutner; Employer Liability for Sexual Harass­
ment: The Morass ofAgency Principles and Respondeat Superior, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 
589 (1993). 
135. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60. 
136. The respondent barely addressed the issue of the supervisor's liability in her 
brief. See Brief for Respondent at 32-33 & n.10, Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 
U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979) ("Mr. Taylor's individual liability for his act as the em­
ployer is not entirely clear under TItle VII, although it would be most peculiar to found 
[sic) liability as an agent in one whose principal was not jointly and severally liable."). 
Meritor Savings Bank did not address the supervisor's liability in its brief, and the 
amici curiae briefs on behalf of both sides also did not discuss the issue. 
At least one commentator has suggested the Meritor decision affirms individual 
liability of supervisors. See 1 SULLIVAN, supra note 30, at § 8.7.4 ("[A)s the [Meritor] 
majority opinion suggests, the harassers are themselves liable because they remain 
agents of the employer and therefore are 'employers' within the meaning of TItle 
VII."). 
137. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69-73. The Meritor decision suggests that particularly 
egregious forms of discrimination that the institutional employer adequately sought to 
prevent would not subject that employer to liability. Unfortunately, in this situation the 
supervisor also could not be liable under Title VII, because the supervisor's conduct 
would not be within the course of his or her agency. ,See Kandel, supra note 6, at pt. 
XIII (discussing liability gap when employers attempt to distance themselves from out­
rageous conduct of their employees); contra EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) 
(1993), quoted at infra note 14l. 
138. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. 
139. Id. 
140. 830 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1987). 
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visor exercises the authority actually delegated to him by his em­
ployer, by making or threatening to make decisions affecting the 
employment status of his subordinates."'141 Since the supervisor in 
Sparks had "actual and apparent authority to alter Sparks' employ­
ment status," and allegedly used this authority to harass Sparks, the 
supervisor could be considered an agent.142 
II. MILLER V. MAXWELL'S INTERNATIONAL, INc 143 
A. FaCts and Procedure of Case 
Phyllis Miller took a position as hostess at Maxwell's Plum 
Restaurant in August 1982.144 During her employment, Miller al­
leged that her supervisors engaged in a series of harassing and dis­
criminatory acts, including reduction of her hours, unequal pay,145 
harassing comments about her age and sex,146 and, eventually, three 
terminations. 
Soon after Miller filed a complaint with her union, she was 
141. Id. at 1559 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70). The Sparks court determined 
that by finding a supervisor to be an agent of the employer, the employer is directly 
liable for the actions of the supervisor. Id. The court quotes the REsrATEMENT (SEC­
OND) OF AGENCY § 219(d)(2) (1958), which establishes the master's liability for the acts 
of its servants when "the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal 
and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the 
tort by the. existence of the agency relation." Id. (emphasis added); see also EEOC 
Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1993), stating: 
[A]n employer ... is responsible for its acts and those of its agents and super­
visory. employees with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether the 
specific acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the em­
ployer and regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known of 
their occurrence. The Commission will examine the circumstances of the par­
ticular employment relationship and the job junctions [sic] performed by the 
individual \n determining whether an individual acts in either a supervisory or 
agency capacity. 
Id. 
142. Sparks, 830 F.2d at 1559-60. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
a!Xordingly overturned the summary judgment in favor of Pilot Freight Carriers, since 
the supervisor's status as agent was Ii genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 1560. 
143. 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Miller v. La Rosa, 114 S. 
Ct.1049 (1994): 
144. [d. at 584. 
145. [d. Miller claims to have managed the "Terrace Garden" in the spring and 
summer of 1983, although she was paid only hostess wages for her work. [d. 
146. [d. Miller alleges that her general managers, Dino La Rosa and Carlo 
Galazio, on several ocCasions made comments that she was too old or that she would 
not be promoted because she was a woman. Miller v. La Rosa, No. C-B7-1906-VRW, 
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7803, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 1990). After her first reinstate­
ment, Miller alleges Galazzo threatened her that she would have a "hard time" if she 
returned to work. [d. at *5. . 
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fired by her general manager, Dino La Rosa.147 She filed charges 
with the EEOC and the National Labor Relations Board 
("NLRB").148 Although she was reinstated,149 her supervisors de­
nied her a full working schedule. She subsequently filed another 
NLRB charge, and Maxwell's fired her a second time nine days 
later.150 She followed up with a second EEOC charge.151 Miller 
was later reinstated, for a short time, but was terminated in the 
spring of 1986.152 
Miller claimed that her general manager, Carlo Galazzo, and 
the CEO of Maxwell's, Donald Schupak, withheld her unemploy­
ment benefits in the spring of 1986.153 Miller received a right-to-sue 
letter from the EEOC on January 24, 1987.154 
Miller filed a pro se claim155 in the district court for the North­
ern District of California on April 24, 1987, against six defendants 
in their individual capacities: Donald Schupak, chief executive of­
ficer of Maxwell's International;156 Dino La Rosa, general manager 
of Maxwell's Plum until 1985; Carlo Galazzo, general manager after 
1985;157 Don Bohn, comptroller and assistant general manager; and 
147. Id. Miller alleges that La Rosa terminated her because of her age and in 
retaliation for her requesting union intervention on the issue of the reduction of her 
hours. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. Maxwell's reinstated Miller with backpay following the union's arbitra­
tion hearings. Id. 
150. Miller, 991 F.2d at 584. 
151. [d. 
152. [d. Miller claimed that her third termination was based on retaliation, age 
discrimination and sex discrimination. Id. Miller further alleged that after her third 
termination, her general manager, Carlo Galazzo, informed a third party that Miller 
was the owner of the restaurant. This allegedly resulted in a suit against Miller by a 
former employee for back wages. La Rosa, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7803, at *6, 
153. Miller, 991 F.2d at 584. An unemployment appeals board hearing followed, 
in which Miller alleges that three lower level supervisors at Maxwell's gave false testi­
mony regarding her. Miller alleged in her complaint that the unemployment appeals 
judge ruled that her third termination was wrongful. La Rosa, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
7803, at *6-7. 
154. La Rosa, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7803, at *7. This letter was sent on Decem­
ber 30, 1986, upon Miller's request, based on her 1984 and 1985 EEOC charges. [d. 
Miller claims that she did not receive this letter until January 24, 1987. Id. 
155. Id. Miller apparently received some legal assistance out of court, however. 
Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1486 (N.D. Cal. 1990). 
156. Miller, 991 F.2d at 584. Miller alleged that Schupak, as CEO, had sole re­
sponsibility over the discriminatory actions of the general managers involved. La Rosa, 
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7803, at *7. The district court dismissed all of the claims against 
Schupak on the basis that Miller alleged insufficient facts to necessitate relief. Id. at *9. 
157. Miller, 991 F.2d at 584. Miller alleged that La Rosa and Galazzo retaliated 
against her by "reducing her hours, refusing to promote her, ... denying [her] culinary 
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Bui Duc Huy and Robert Stewart, dining room directors.15S Miller 
was allowed to amend her complaint three timesI59 before it was 
dismissed.1OO 
In deciding the issue of individual liability under Title VII and 
the ADEA, both Judge Schwarzer in his January 17, 1990 decision, 
and Judge Walker in his decision to dismiss, stated that the supervi­
sors could be sued in their individual capacities if sufficient claims 
of discrimination were alleged against them.16I 
training ... , writing false letters about [her] job performance, and otherwise harassing 
her." La Rosa, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7803, at *4. The district court dismissed the 
claims against La Rosa because he was not named in the original EEOC charge, thus 
denying him the opportunity to assemble the necessary material for this action. Id. at 
*22. The court also dismissed the claims against Galazzo because Miller failed to prop­
erly state a cla4n for retaliation. Id. at *23-24. 
158. Miller, 991 F.2d at 584. Miller alleged that Bohn, Huy, and Stewart notified 
her of her first termination, falsely testified in her EEOC hearings, and retaliated by 
failing to give her letters of recommendation. La Rosa, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7803, at 
*8-11. The district court dismissed these claims based on Miller's failure to allege suffi­
cient facts on which to grant relief. [d. at *10-11. 
159. Miller's initial complaints alleged sex and age discrimination, wrongful ter­
mination, retaliation, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negli­
gent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy, and violation of the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Miller v. Galazzo, No. C-87­
1906-WWS, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17034, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 1989). District 
Judge Schwarzer granted Miller leave to file an amended complaint with a short plain 
statement of her specific claims against the individual defendants. Id. at *2. 
Her second amended complaint was hardly improved. Miller, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. 
Cas. (BNA) at 1486 (complaint was "clutter[ed] ... with pejorative, argumentative and 
irrelevant assertions"). Judge Schwarzer allowed Miller to amend her claims of sex and 
age discrimination, infliction of emotional distress, and retaliation a third time; the 
other claims were dismissed. Id. at 1486-88. 
160. La Rosa, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7803, at *24-25. 
161. Miller, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1486 (Schwarzer, J.); La Rosa, 1990 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7803 (Walker, J.). In his January 17, 1990, decision, Judge Schwarzer 
determined that claims could be brought against individual supervisors under Title VII 
and the ADEA. Miller, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1487. First, Judge 
Schwarzer distinguished Padway v. Palches, 665 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1982), because 
Padway involved a claim against a school superintendent, not a suit against a private 
employer. Additionally, Padway gave only a cursory analysis of the individual liability 
issue. Id.; see supra note 117 for a discussion of Padway. Second, Judge Schwarzer 
determined that although "it is unlikely that Congress intended to impose personallia­
bility on employees," the text of Title VII did not preclude individual liability. Miller, 
" 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1487. 
Judge Walker, in dismissing Miller's final complaint, reinforced Judge Schwarzer's 
reasoning that individual supervisors could be held liable. La Rosa, 1990 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 7803, at *2 n.1. Judge Walker noted that even though a settlement with a princi­
pal generally operates as a settlement with the agents, such is not the case when the 
"evidence shows the plaintiff intended a contrary result. [d. (citing Transpac Constr. Co. 
v. Clark & Groff Eng'rs, Inc., 466 F.2d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 1972». Miller "repeatedly 
sought assurances from the [bankruptcy] judge that she would be able to continue this 
action against the individual defendants." Id. Nevertheless, Judge Walker found that 
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B. Majority Opinion in Miller162 
After addressing the jurisdictional issues and Miller's other 
claims,163 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined 
that individual defendants could not be held personally liable under 
either Title VII or the ADEA.l64 The court first established that 
Title VII and the ADEA have the same liability schemes; "they 
both limit civil liability to the employer."165 Citing Padway v. 
Palches,166 the court stated that because civil liability was assessed 
only to the employer under Title VII, individual defendants could 
not be held liable for backpay.167 
The court recognized that some courts have held individual de­
fendants liable to Title VII claimants,168 but the majority concluded 
that many of these courts "held individuals liable only in their offi-
Miller did not provide sufficient evidence to support her claim against the individual 
defendants. See supra notes 156-58. 
162. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub 
nom. Miller v. La Rosa, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994). 
163. Although Miller failed to file a timely appeal, the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit heard Miller's claim due. to the "unique circumstances" created by the 
district court's erroneous order for extension of time to request alteration or amend­
ment of the district court judgment. Id. at 585 (citing Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1324, 
1329 (9th Cir. 1987». 
The Miller court further determined that Miller' alleged sufficient willful conduct 
for her ADEA claim to have been accorded the three-year statute of limitations, in­
stead of the two-year limitation imposed by the district court. Id. at 586. The court also 
held that the district court erred in barring the remainder of Miller's ADEA claim 
under the defense of laches because Congress provided a statute of limitations to apply 
to the action. Id. (citing Int'ITel. & Tel. Corp. v. GTE, 518 F.2d 913, 926 (9th Cir. 
1975». 	 . 
Miller's emotional distress claims were barred by California's one-year statute of 
limitations. Id.; see Cal. Civ. Proc'. Code § 340(3) (West Supp. 1994). 
164. Miller, 991 F.2d at 587-88. 
165. Id. at 587. The court pointed out ·that when origi~ally instituted, TItle VII 
only allowed for backpay and reinstatement of employment, while the ADEA allowed 
liquidated damages for willful conduct. Id. With the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, Congress made compensatory and punitive damages available under TItle VII. 
See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text. 
166. 665 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1982); see supra note 117 for a discussion of the 
Padway decision. . . 
167. Miller, 991 F.2d at 587. John Pemberton, Jr., the regional district attorney of 
the EEOC who followed the Miller case, stated that his office considered the Padway 
decision "gratuitous dictum." His research showed that the parties did not even brief 
the individual liability issue in PadwaY. Steven G. Hirsch, Job Bias Victims Can't Sue 
Managers, THE RECORDER, Apr. 20, 1993. 
168. Miller, 991 F.2d at 587 (citing Hamilton V. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 442-43 (5th 
Cir. 1986), limited by Harvey V. Blake, 913 F.2d 226, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1990»; cf. Barger 
V. Kansas, 630 F. Supp. 88, 90-92 (D. Kan. 1985). 
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cial capacities."169 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
adopted the district court's rationale170 that the purpose of includ­
ing "agents'; within the employer definition was to incorporate re­
spondeat superior liability into Title VII.l7l 
The majority opinion further noted that the statutory scheme 
of the two acts sugge~ts that Congress did not intend to impose indi­
vidual liability on employees.l72 . Because both Title VII and the 
ADEA limit liability to employers with more than a certain number 
of employees,173 the court inferred that Congress did not intend "to 
burden small entities with the. costs associated with litigating dis­
crimination claims."174 As a result of this limitation, Congress 
could not have intended' to impose civil liability on individual 
employees.175 
The court concluded that even though Padway was decided 
prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,176 it is still good 
law,117 and it is applicable to both the Title VII and the ADEA 
claimsP8 In addition, the majority refuted the statement made by 
169. Miller, 991 F.2d at 587 (citing Harvey, 913 F.2d at 227-28 & n.2; Barger, 630 
F. Supp. at 91-92; York v. Tennessee Crushed Stone Ass'n, 684 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 
1982». 
170. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1486, 1487 (N.D. 
Cal. 1990). 
171. Miller, 991 F.2d at 587. 
172. Id. 
173. TItle VII applies only to employers engaged in an industry affecting com­
merce with 15 or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988); see supra note 66 for 
the text of this section. 
The ADEA limits liability to those "persons" with 20 or more employees. 29 
U.S.C. § 630(b) (1988); see supra note 82. 
174. Miller, 991 F.2d at 587. 
175. Id. 
176. Pub. L. No. 102-166,105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in various sections 
of 2 U.S.c., 29 U.S.c., and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 2000e). The majority noted that 
because Congress specifically limited the damages available under the new Act depend­
ing upon the employer's size, see 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A)-(D), and because Con­
gress did not include "individuals" within the statute's limitations, presumably Congress 
did not intend to impose liability on individuals. Miller, 991 F.2d at 587-88 n.2. 
177. Miller, 991 F.2d at 587-88 n.2. Judge Fletcher, in dissent, conceded that indi­
vidual employees could not be held liable for backpay under TItle VII prior to the Act's 
amendment, but inferred that individuals may be held personally liable for compensa­
tory and punitive damages in cases where the discrimination was intentional. Id. at 589 
(Fletcher, J., dissenting). 
178. Id. at 587-88. In a footnote, the majority disputed the dissent's argument 
that the liability schemes under TItle VII and the ADEA should not be interpreted 
similarly. According to the court, the arguments put forth in House v. Cannon Mills 
Co., 713 F. Supp. 159 (M.D.N.C. 1988), upon which the dissent relied, are not persua­
sive because: (1) the Civil Rights Act of 1991 made available compensatory and puni­
tive damages, which had distinguished the ADEA from TItle VII when House was 
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the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Hamilton v. Rodgers179 
that employees will "believe that they may violate Title VII with 
impunity."18o The majority further noted that the scope of Hamil­
ton was limited by the Fifth Circuit's decision "four years later in 
Harvey v. Blake.181 
C. Judge Fletcher's DissentI82 
Although Judge Fletcher disapproved of the majority's holding 
regarding individual liability under Title VII,183 she was neverthe­
less hesitant to reject the court's reasoning.l84 Judge Fletcher as-
decided; and (2) although the ADEA incorporates some provisions of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1988), it does not incorporate the "employer" 
definition into the ADEA. Miller, 991 F.2d at 588 n.3. 
179. 791 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1986). See supra note 90 for a discussion of the Ham­
ilton decision. 
180. Miller, 991 F.2d at 588 (citing Hamilton, 791 F.2d at 443). The majority fur­
ther stated: 
[T]he [Hamilton] court's reasoning is unsound. No employer will allow super­
visory or other personnel to violate Title VII when the employer is liable for 
the Title VII violation. An employer that has incurred civil damages because 
one of its employees believes he can violate Title VII with impunity ~ill 
quickly correct that employee's erroneous belief. 
Id. 
Accord Vodde v. Indiana Mich. Power Co., 852 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ind. 1994). In 
Vodde, the court opined that "the normally deep-pocketed and publicity conscious em­
ployer (in general contrast to the ordinary supervisory employee bent on pursuing some 
private agenda) can be counted upon to be the most effective guardian of the market­
place." Id. at 681. 
181. 913 F.2d 226, 228 n.2 (5th Cir. 1990); see supra note 90. 
182. Miller, 991 F.2d at 588. 
183. Miller, 991 F.2d at 589. "I am concerned that the majority's overbroad lan­
guage may unnecessarily cloud decisionmaking under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 .... 
This significant revision may permit suits against individuals for compensatory and pu­
nitive damages where the discrimination was intentional." Id. (citations omitted). 
Judge Fletcher also cited cases that allowed individual defendants to be sued in 
their official capacity for injunctive relief. Id. at 588 (citing Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 
226,227-28 (5th Cir. 1990); Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1557-59 
(11th Cir. 1987); Canada v. Boyd Group, Inc~, 809 F. Supp. 771, 779 & n.3 (D. Nev. 
1992); Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 772 F. Supp. 407, 410-11 (N.D. Ill. 1991». 
Interestingly, the majority also used the "individual in official capacity" argument 
to buttress the assertion that the purpose' of the "agent" provision was to incorporate 
respondeat superior liability into Title VII. Id. at 587. 
184. Id. at 589. Judge Fletcher cited 42 U.S.c. § 1981a(b)(3), which limits the 
damages for which an employer can be held liable, depending on the number of em­
ployees. In light of these damage limitations, Judge Fletcher was uncertain about the 
effect of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in regards to the issue of individual liability under 
Title VII. Miller, 991 F.2d at 589. Nevertheless, Judge Fletcher implied that Padway 
should not be applied to claims occurring after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, because when Padway was decided, only backpay and reinstatement were avail­
able as remedies under Title VII. Id. 
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serted that the ADEA liability scheme is different from the liability 
scheme of TItle VII. Therefore, the court should have analyzed the 
individual liability issue under the ADEA separately from the TItle 
VII issue.185 Citing House v. Cannon Mills CO.,186 Judge Fletcher 
presented two notable differences between the two statutes. First, 
when the ADEA was enacted, the scope of relief under this act was 
much broader than the relief available under TItle VII.187 Second, 
the dissent asserted that "'the ADEA incorporates the remedies 
and procedures of the Fair Labor Standards Act ... , which differ 
from those under TItle VII. "'188 Since individuals could be held 
personally liable under the FLSA,189 the same result should apply 
to an ADEA action. l90 
Judge Fletcher concluded that the House decision was "a thor­
ough and well-reasoned opinion,"191 and therefore, its holding 
should be applied in cases where supervisors take part in the 
wrongful termination decision. l92 
III. ANALYSIS 
In refusing to hold individual defendants personally liable 
under either TItle VII or the ADEA, the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit narrowly interpreted acts that Congress intended to 
185. Id. 
186. 713 F. Supp. 159, 160 (M.D.N.C. 1988). 
187. Miller, 991 F.2d at 589. "The difference in the scope of relief, in the House 
court's view, foreclosed reliance on Padway in dete~ing individual liability under the 
ADEA." Id. The dissent also pointed out that the "construction of the limitations 
categories" of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 suggests that the damages available under 
the ADEA are still more expansive. Id. at 589 n.l. 
188. Miller, 991 F.2d at 589 (quoting House, 713 F. Supp. at 160). In support of 
her proposition, Judge Fletcher cited the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 582 (1978), which stated: "This selectivity that Congress 
exhibited in incorporating provisions and in modifying certain FLSA practices strongly 
suggests that but for those changes Congress expressly made, it intended to incorporate 
fully [into the ADEA] the remedies and procedures of the FLSA." Id. 
189. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text. 
190. Miller, 991 F.2d at 589. Judge Fletcher stated: 
There is no question that an individual can be personally liable as an employer 
under the FLSA; adverse employment actions attributable to individuals as a 
consequence of their authority over employment decisions can lead to individ­
ual liability where those actions violate the FLSA. The same result should 
apply to actions brought under the ADEA. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
191. Id. Judge Fletcher stated that Judge Posner of the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit cited House with approval in Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398 (7th 
Cir. 1990). Miller, 991 F.2d at 589 n.2. 
192. Miller, 991 F.2d at 589-90. 
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be applied liberally.193 The statutory language and the legislative 
intent of Title VII and the ADEA suggest that individual employ­
ees could be held personally liable under both ActS.194 There are 
also strong arguments to suggest that individuals could be held per­
sonally liable under the ADEA independent of Title VII. 
A. 	 The Plain Meaning .of the Statutory Language Suggests' that 
"Agents" Are "Emplqyers" 
"Employer" is defiIied in both Title VII and the ADEA195 to 
include agents of the employer.196 Although "agent" is not defined 
py either Act, courts h~lVe found "agents" to be people with deci­
sion-making power197 and significant control over the plaintiff's em­
ployment status.198 Thus, supervisors who engage in discriminatory 
acts are "agents," and therefore "employers," under Title VII and 
the ADEA.199 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Miller recog­
nized that agents were included in the definition of Title VII and 
the ADEA. Nevertheless, the court refused to find agents to be 
"employers" for purposes of liability.2OO Instead, the court stated 
that the "obvious purpose of this [agent] provision was to incorpo­
193. For cases supporting the liberal application of TItle VII, see supra note 8 and 
accompanying text. 
194. For TItle VII background, see supra notes 24-46 and accompanying text. For 
ADEA background, see supra notes 47-61 and accompanying text. 
195. For the purposes of parts A and B of this subsection, this Note will treat the 
definitions of employer under the ADEA and TItle VII as the same. 
196. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of the defini­
tion of "employer" under TItle VII, and note 82 for the definition of "employer" under 
the ADEA. See also Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment Liability Under 
Agency Principles: A Second Look at Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 44 VAND. 
L. REV. 1229, 1258 (1991). 	 . 
197. 	 See supra .note 90 and accompanying text. 
198. 	 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
199. See Livingston, supra note 76, at 68-69. Including "agent" within the "em­
ployer" definition "provides a logical basis for concluding that Congress intended that 
owners, supervisors and other managerial personnel be subject to TItle VII .iability, 
including liability for compensatory and punitive damages, where they participat~d in 
discriminatory decisionmaking." Id. . . 
200. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied 
sub nom. Miller v. La Rosa, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994). The court relied on Padway v. 
Palches, 665 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1982), as precedent that individuals could not be held 
liable for backpay: Miller, 991 F.2d at 587. However, the court in Padway did not give 
any authority for this determination, and its status' as precedent is questionable since 
neither party in Padway briefed the issue of individual liability of agents. See Hirsch, 
supra note 167. 
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rate respondeat superior liability into" TItle VII.201 However, the 
court failed to offer any authority for this proposition.202 
The plain language of the statute203 lends no support to the 
Ninth Circuit's ipterpretation. It is a recognized canon of statutory 
construction that when a word is d~fined in a statute, the definition 
applies throughout the a~t, regardless of how the word may be de­
fined in common usage.204 The dalpages provisions of TItle VII and 
the ADEA permit remedies against "employers."205 Thus, because 
the definition of "employer" includes agents, the damages provi­
sions of TItle VIJ and of the, ADEA extend to hold agents liable. 
Because the provision protecting against sex discrimination 
was a late addition to TItle VII,206 courts have not frequently relied 
on' legislative history in sex discrimination cases.207 Generally, 
courts have relied on the literal meaning208 and post-enactment his­
tory of TItle VII for guidance.209 With the increased focus on legis­
lative history in recent years, the plain meaning rule has been 
201. Miller, 991 F.2d at 5ff7 (alteratipns in original) (quoting Miller v, Maxwell's 
Int'l, 52 Fair EmpL Prac, Cas, (BNA) 1486, 1487 (N.D. Cal. 1990». 
202. Cf. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1985), affd sub nom. Mer­
itorSav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) ("The legislative history of Title VII is 
virtually barren of indications, one way or another, of a vicarious responsibility for em­
ployers."); see also Phillips, supra note 196, at 1258 (stating that 42 U.S.c. § 2000e(b) 
"is' an individual liability provision, not a vicarious liability' provision under which 
agents' discriminatory actions are imputed to their employers"). 
203. The "plain meaning rule" states that "where the language of an enactment is 
clear and construction according to its terms does not lead to absurd or impracticable 
consequences, the words employed are to be taken as the final expression of the mean­
ing intended." Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" 
and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 CoLUM. L. REv. 1299, 
1299 (1975) (quoting United States v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929». 
204. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392-93 n.lO (1979); In re Perroton, 958 
F.2d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 1992); 2A NORMAN J. SINGER; SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 47.07, at 151-52 (5th ed. 1992). See, e.g., Reed Dickerson, Statutory 
Interpretation: Dipping Into Legislative History, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125 (1983). 
Even applying a commondictionary's definition, "employer" is defined to include 
agents with hiring authority: WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 
supra note 73, at 743. 
205. See supra notes 42-46 & 77-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
damage provisions of Title VII. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text for the 
damage provisions of the ADEA. 
206. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
207. See Barbara L. Graham, Supreme Court Policymaking in Civil Rights Cases: 
A Study of Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, in 3A SINGER, SUTHERLAND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 659 (5th ed. 1992). 
208. See supra note 203 for the classic articulation of the plain meaning rule. 
209. Graham, supra note 207, at 667. 
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subject to criticism.210 Nevertheless, the plain meaning rule must 
be relied on in the absence of any applicable legislative history.211 
The court in Johnson v. Northern Indiana Public Service CO.212 
provided an interesting method by which Congress could choose to 
alter this provision in the future to permit individual liability: 
change "and any agent" to "or any agent."213 Nevertheless, the 
court erred in refusing to find liability under the present reading of 
the statute. Under the present reading, "and any agent" simply 
means that an agent can be an "employer" in addition to the institu­
tional employer. Under the Johnson court's reasoning, amending 
the statute to "or any agent" would allow plaintiffs to circumvent 
the minimum employee requirement that designates employers by 
seeking recovery from an agent. This agent could be the owner of a 
small company or a person likely to be indemnified by the company 
in a lawsuit.214 
B. 	 The Legislative History Is Inconclusive as to Congress' Intent 
Regarding Personal Liability215 
Congress did not address the issue of individual liability during 
its debates over Title VII216 or the ADEA.217 Nevertheless, an ex­
amination of the legislative history suggests that Congress would 
favor individual liability for those directly responsible for acts of 
discrimination. 
Title VII's history demonstrates a steady broadening of the 
scope of damages available to victims of discrimination. The Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972218 expanded liability to in­
210. See generally Murphy, supra note 203 (discussing the merits of abandoning 
the plain meaning rule). 
211. Id. at 1303. "The plain words and meaning of a statute cannot be overcome 
by a legislative history which, through strained processes of deduction from events of 
wholly ambiguous significance, may furnish dubious bases for inference in every direc­
tion." Id. (quoting Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244,260 (1945». 
212. 	 844 F. Supp. 466, 468 (N.D. Ind. 1994). 
213. 	 See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text. 
214. 	 Johnson, 844 F. Stipp. at 469. 
215. If the language of a statute is unambiguous, that language is conclusive, 
absent clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 
113A S. Ct. 1163, 1169 (1993); Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 873 (1991). 
216. See supra notes 24-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the back­
ground of Title VII. 
217. See supra notes 47-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of the back­
ground of the ADEA. 
218. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 5108 & 
5314 and various sections of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e). 
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clude public employers as well as small employers.219 The Civil 
Rights Act of 1991220 further expanded the scope of liability by per­
mitting compensatory and punitive damages.221 Furthermore, 
courts should liberally interpret Title VII to provide compensation 
for victims of discrimination.222 
The court of appeals in Miller determined that Congress in­
tended to exclude "small entities" by limiting liability to only those 
employers with fifteen or more employees.223 According to the 
court, Congress could not have intended for individuals to be found 
personally liable under Title VII.224 An examination of the legisla­
tive history, however, shows the flaw in the court's reasoning.225 
Congress expanded the definition of "employer" in 1972 to ap­
ply to small businesses responsible for discriminatory conduct.226 
By rejecting the portion of the House bill227 establishing the em­
ployee limit at eight, Congress compromised in order to satisfy 
those concerned with the effect on small business.228 The concern 
was that many small businesses were family run and that the owners 
were unfamiliar with the intricacies of federal law.229 Conse­
quently, it would be improper to hold such businesses liable under 
Title VII.230 
219. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text. 
- 220. Pub. L. No. 102-166,105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in various sections 
of 2 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 2000e). 
221. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text. 
222. See supra note 8 and cases cited therein. 
223. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub 
nom. Miller v. La Rosa, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994); contra Bishop v. Okidata, Inc., 864 F. 
Supp. 416 (D.NJ. 1994) (finding small employers exempted from Title VII and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act because of undue burden on financial condition, but 
noting that individuals have always been liable for torts Committed in the workplace, 
and, thus, should be subject to personal liability). 
224. Miller,991 F.2d at 587. 
225. This reasoning is flawed when you consider that "employer" is defined to 
include "any person," and person is defined to include "one or more individuals." 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1988). Under this interpretation, an 
individual that is engaged in an industry affecting commerce and supervises fifteen or 
more employees could be considered an employer. This individual could simultane­
ously be an agent of a larger entity, yet the individual could still be personally liable for 
his own discriminatory acts or those of his supervisory employees. 
226. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text. 
227. See H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971). 
228. See supra note 69. 
229. See Lamberson, supra note 5, at 427. Congress, in debating the limitation on 
the number of employees, focused on "the effect on the personal nature of small busi­
nesses and not to the financial hardship that might occur." Id. (citing 110 CoNG. REc. 
12,645-47 (1964». 
230. H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971). 
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It is highly unlikely that Congress was so subtle as to suggest 
that individuals should not be liable because they are "small enti­
ties." If this was Congress' intention, it could have placed the same 
number restriction on agents as it did on employers.231 Further­
more, the availability of tort-like remedies232 is additional evidence 
that Congress would approve finding discriminators liable.233 
After presenting the basis for its opinion, the court in Miller 
atteinpted to reconcile its decision with other cases which found su­
pervisors to be agents, liable only in their "official" capacities.234 
Nevertheless, there is no evidence that Congress intended to limit 
agent liability in this way. Congress, in enacting the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991,235 permitted the awarding of compensatory and puni­
tive damages, damages which are regularly held against individuals 
(as opposed to reinstatement and backpay).236 In addition, the "of­
ficiaUindividual" distinction is flawed in light of the personal nature 
of discrimination. In situations where the employer has sufficiently 
distanced itself from the discriminatory act, finding supervisors lia­
ble only in their "official" capacities leaves victims of discrimination 
without a remedy. 
Clearly, courts have raised important issues involving the im­
. position of compensatory and punitive damages under the frame­
231. See supra note 225. 
232. The Court in United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992), determined that 
Title VII remedies existing prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (i.e., 
backpay, reinstatement and injunctive relief) were wage-like, not tort-like, for tax pur­
poses. However, the Court did not address whether the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which 
permitted additional remedies of compensatory and punitive damages, would have an 
effect on this determination. Id. at 1872 n.8; contra 112 S. Ct. at 1878 (O'Conner, J., 
dissenting) ("[T]he remedies available to Title VII plaintiffs do not fix the character of 
. the right they seek to enforce. 	 The purposes and operation of Title VII are closely 
analogous to those of tort law, and that similarity should determine excludability of 
recoveries for personal injury [under the tax code]."). 
233. The court in Miller also pointed to the limitations for compensatory damages 
based on employer size as evidence that Congress did not intend to impose individual 
liability. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied 
sub nom. Miller v. La Rosa, 114 S. Q. 1049 (1994). However, these damage provisions 
are likely to face court challenges. CONTE, supra note 4, at § 2.21 (Supp. 1993). Bills 
have also been submitted in the House and the Senate that would either eliminate com­
pletely or severely restrict these damage caps. See supra note 80. 
234. 991 F.2d at 587; see supra note 169. 
235. Congress did not amend the definition of "employer" in the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991, so arguably the congressional intent as to the interpretation of this statute is 
limited to its initial enactment and its subsequent amendment in 1972. The increase in 
available damages is only evidence as to what Congress' present intent may be on this 
issue. 
236. See, e.g., Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 800 F. Supp. 1172, 1180 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992); contra Vodde v. Indiana Mich. Power Co., 852 F. Supp. 676, 680 (N.D. Ind. 1994). 
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work estabiished by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.237 Congress 
needs to create a liability scheme for individuals that would be pro­
portionate to the size of the supervisor's employer. The present 
scheme of liability for these damages is not indicative of congres­
siomil intent to preclud.e personal liability, but rather demonstrates 
that Congress did not contemplate the issue of individual liability at 
all. Congress has not "clearly expressed [a] legislative intent" con­
trary to the express reading of the statute. Therefore, the unambig­
uous language of the statute must control.238 
The Supreme Court of the United States stated in Meritor Sav­
ings Bank, FSB v. Vinson239 that courts should apply common law 
agency principles in determining whether employers can be held li­
able for the discriminatory actions of their supervisors.240 At least 
one commentator has stated that the Meritor Court implied that 
supervisors could actually be held individually liable under TItle 
VII.241 However, supervisors cannot be considered agents242 when 
acting outside the scope of employment.243 Thus, TItle VII would 
not cover extreme forms of discrimination by employees for which 
courts would not find employers directly liable.244 
Courts have had considerable difficulty in applying agency 
237. See Saville v. Houston County Healthcare Auth., 852 F. Supp. 1512 (M.D. 
Ala. 1994); see also supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
Saville decision. 
238. See supra note 215 and cases cited therein. 
239. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
240. See supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of ·the Mer­
itor decision. 
241. See 1 SULLIVAN, supra note 30, at § 8.7.4 ("[A]s the [Meritor] majority opin­
ion suggests, the harassers are themselves liable because they remain agents of the em­
ployer and therefore are 'employers' within the meaning of Title VII."). Courts have 
also applied agency principles against supervisors individually. See Lamirande v. Reso­
lution Trust Corp., 834 F. Supp. 526, 529 & n.3 (D.N.H. 1993); Griffith v. Keystone Steel 
& Wire, 858 F. Supp. 802 (C.D. Ill. 1994). 
242. See supra note 137. 
243. See Maria M. Carrillo, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment by a Supervi­
sor Under Title VII: Reassessment of Employer Liability in Light of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991, 24 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 41, 67 (1992-93). 
Factors used in determining scope of employment include determining where the 
discriminatory act occurred, when the act occurred, and whether the act was foresee­
able by the employer. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 217-32 
(1958). Even if an act is explicitly forbidden by the employer, it may still be within the 
scope of employment. Id. at § 230. Section 235 provides: "An act of a servant is not 
within the scope of employment if it is done with no intention to perform it as a part of 
or incident to a service on account of which he is employed." Id. at § 235. 
244. Arguably, this results in a "liability gap." See Kandel, supra note 6. How­
ever, courts are beginning to develop a common law tort of discrimination that may 
provide a remedy against supervisors individually. See Terry M. Dworkin et aI., Theo­
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principles in ntle VII and ADEA cases.245 . In fact, the Meritor 
Court itself stated that "such common-law principles may not be 
transferable' in all their particulars to Title VII."246 Thus, the 
Court's statement that Congress' intent in establishing the "agent" 
provision was .for courts. to apply ag~ncy principles to determine 
when employers should be liable has not been well accepted in the 
legal community.247 
C. Individual Liability Under the ADEA 
Congress passed the ADEA in order to provide even stronger 
penalties for age discrimination than were available under Title VII. 
Congress did this because age discrimination was often more subtle 
and more widespread than sex or race discrimination. The ADEA 
from its enactment provided greater remedies, although small busi­
nesses were granted more immunity under the statutory 
provisions.248 
Some courts have distinguished the ADEA from ntle VII with 
regard to individual liability based on'the ADEA's relation to the 
FLSA, which has widely been accepted to provide remedies against 
individual defendants.249 Althoughthe ADEA's definition of "em­
ployer" more closely resembles the Title VII definition than it does 
the FLSA's,250 the interpretation of the ADEA definition of "em­
ries ofRecovery for Sexual Harassment: Going Beyond Title VII,25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
125 (1988). 
Notably, there has been a sharp increase over the past ten years of common law 
tort action against employers. See Ronald M. Green, The Manager's Personal Liability 
in Issues of Employment Law, II ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: EMPLOY. 
MENT DISCRIMINATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 
927, 930 (1988). Common law causes of action frequently brought include assault and 
battery, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and 
false imprisonment. Id.; see also Brown & Abell, supra note 13, at pt. V(A}. 
245. See generally Phillips, supra note 196, at 1255 (stating that agency rules are 
poorly adapted to supervisor sexual harassment cases because the primary aim of these 
rules is to determine the principal's liability to third parties, not to their own employ­
ees); Lutner, supra note 134, at 598 & 599 ("The guidance offered by Meritor has 
proven inadequate ... [and] lower courts have applied agency principles to hostile 
environment sexual harassment cases with varied results."). 
246. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,72 (1986). 
247. See Lutner, supra note 134, at 602·08. 
248. The definition of "employer" under the ADEA requires a minimum of 20 
employees, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b} (1988), compared to TItle VII's minimum of 15 employ­
ees. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e(b} (1988). 
249. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text. 
250. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 630(b} (1988) (quoted in full supra note 82) with 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988) (quoted in full supra note 66) and 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1988) 
(quoted supra note 84). 
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ployer" is distinguishable from Title VII. 
In the Miller dissent, Judge Fletcher argued that liability under 
the ADEA should be distinguished from liability under Title VII.251 
Adopting the holding in House v. Cannon Mills Co. ,252 Judge 
Fletcher argued that the ADEA expressly and impliedly incorpo­
rated the FLSA remedy provisions and the case law that accompa­
nies them.253 Thus, "the clear import of the statutory language" of 
the ADEA suggests that employee supervisors should be person­
ally liable.254 
A review of the statutory language of the ADEA, the legisla­
tive history of the Act, and the subsequent case law strongly sug­
gests that if individual liability is found under Title VII, such 
liability should also be found under the ADEA (assuming the em­
ployer has more than twenty employees). Even without Title VII 
liability, it seems clear that individuals can be held liable under the 
ADEA. By incorporating the remedies of the FLSA, the ADEA 
also acquired the interpretations of the remedy provisions accorded 
under the FLSA, including the establishment of individual 
liability.255 
Nevertheless, because of the similarities between the definition 
of "employer" under the ADEA and Title VII, many courts con­
tinue to hold that the two statutes should be given the same inter­
pretation with regard to this issue. The FLSA definition, 
establishing an employer as "any person acting directly or indirectly 
in the interest of an employer,"256 is broader, but nonetheless com­
parable, to the ADEA's agent provision. Looking to common in­
terpretations of "agent," one dictionary defined an agent as "one 
that acts for or in the place of another by authority from him."257 
The court in House affirmed that although the ADEA did not "ex­
pressly incorporate" the FLSA definition, the two definitions are 
251. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 589 (9th Cir. 1993) (Fletcher, I., 
dissenting), cert. denied sub nom. Miller v. La Rosa, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994). 
252. 713 F. Supp. 159 (M.D.N.C. 1988). 
253. Miller, 991 F.2d at 589. The Miller court rejected the House opinion on the 
basis that it was decided prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which 
created damages similar to those available under the ADEA. Id. The majority also 
rejected the adoption of case law interpreting the "employer" definition since the 
ADEA does not explicitly incorporate the FLSA definition. Id. at 588 n.3. 
254. Id. at 589 (citing House, 713 F. Supp. at 161-62). 
255. Of course, the FLSA provides no guidance in determining individual liability 
under TItle VII. 
256. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1988). 
257. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 73, at 40. 
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comparable.258 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the history and interpretations of Title VII and the 
ADEA, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit erred in con­
cluding that individual supervisors could not be held personally lia­
ble for acts of discrimination.259 The plain meaning of the 
definition of "employer" under both Title VII and the ADEA sug­
gests that "agents" are to be considered employers for the purposes 
of the acts.260 The damages provisions of both acts provide reme­
dies against "employers."261 Since the legislative intent is ambigu­
ous as to whether individuals can be held liable, the clear statutory 
language controls. Finally, courts have found individual liability 
under the ADEA based on its relationship with the FLSA. 
Cases such as Miller v. Maxwell's International, Inc. demon­
strate the importance in finding individual liability under circum­
stances where the victim of discrimination cannot otherwise be 
made whole. Finding supervisors liable will create a "front line de­
fense" against discrimination.262 Although Congress needs to 
establish a proper measure of compensatory and punitive damages 
to be assessed against supervisors,263 victims of discrimination are 
258. House v. Cannon Mills Co., 713 F. Supp. 159, 160 n.1 (M.D.N.C. 1988). 
259. Miller v. Maxwell's In1'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub 
nom. Miller V. La Rosa, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994). 
260. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988); 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1988). 
261. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1993); 42 U.S.c. § 1981a (Supp. V 
1993); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988); see supra notes 42-46,60-61,77-81, and accompanying 
text. 
262. Williams, supra note 13, at 218. "Supervisors and managers provide the 
front line defense against employment discrimination for the institutional employer. 
Personal liability provides a greater incentive for the individual supervisor to guarantee 
a discrimination-free workplace." Id. 
263. See Theodore F. Claypoole, Inadequacies in Civil Rights Law: The Need for 
Sexual Harassment Legislation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1151, 1169 (1987). 
Congress should create a federal cause of action against the harassing em­
ployee . . .. Assignment of persorialliability to any supervisory employee who 
sexually harasses a nonsupervisory employee, and holding the harassing em­
ployee responsible for equitable, compensatory, and punitive relief would 
prove most effective. Allowing such penalties strikes at the heart of sexual 
harassment by forcing employees to be personally accountable for their own 
actions in the workplace. The severity of the penalties serves as a punishment 
for socially unacceptable behavior and a warning to other employees. 
Id. 
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still entitled 
paying. 
to adequate compensation from those capable of 
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